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Repair services, medical treatments, the provision of software programs, or a taxi 
ride in an unknown city are prime examples of what is known as a credence good in 
the economics literature. Generally speaking, credence goods have the characteristic 
that though consumers can observe the utility they derive from the good ex post, 
they cannot judge whether the type or quality of the good they have received is the 
ex ante needed one. Moreover, consumers may even ex post be unable to observe 
which type or quality they actually received. An expert seller, however, is able to 
identify the type or quality that fits a consumer’s needs by performing a diagnosis. 
He can then provide the right quality and charge for it, or he can exploit the informa-
tion asymmetry by defrauding the consumer.
Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni (1973) have introduced the term credence goods 
and added this type of good to Phillip Nelson’s (1970) classification of ordinary, 
search and experience goods.1 It is noteworthy that Darby and Karni (1973) were, 
in fact, obstetricians for two strands of literature on credence goods. While one 
strand takes the characteristic mentioned above—consumers do not know what 
1 Ordinary goods (such as petrol) have well-known characteristics, and subjects know where to get them. Search 
goods (like clothes) need to be inspected before buying in order to observe their characteristics. Experience goods 
(like wine) have unknown characteristics, but they are revealed after buying or consuming them.
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they need, but they observe the utility from what they get—as the defining feature, 
the second is based on the definition that credence goods have qualities which are 
expensive to judge even after purchase. Typical examples mentioned in this second 
strand of literature are goods vertically differentiated by process attributes (as, e.g., 
whether food has been produced organically or not, whether tuna has been caught 
with dolphin-friendly methods or not, or whether electricity has been generated with 
a low-emissions technology or not), and a typical assumption made is that consum-
ers know what they want or need, but observe neither what they get nor the utility 
derived from what they get.2 In this article we adhere to the first definition, which is 
also the definition used by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) in their survey of the 
credence goods literature.
The information asymmetries prevalent in credence goods markets lead to sev-
eral types of inefficiencies which capture wide public attention. To define them 
systematically, consider a car owner bringing his vehicle to a garage for repair. 
The mechanic—as an expert seller—might have an incentive to cheat on the con-
sumer in two dimensions: First, the repair might be inefficient. The mechanic might 
replace more parts than are actually necessary to bring the car back on the road (and 
charge for the additional time and material). This case is referred to as overtreat-
ment because the additional benefits to the consumer are smaller than the additional 
costs. The mechanic’s repair might also be insufficient, thus leaving the consumer 
with a bill, but with a car that is still not working properly. This latter case is referred 
to as undertreatment since any material and time spent on the repair is pure waste. 
Second, the repair might be appropriate, but the mechanic might charge the con-
sumer for more than he has actually done (e.g., by claiming to have changed a filter 
without having done so). This kind of problem is known as overcharging and it can 
also lead to inefficiencies in the long run if the fear of getting overcharged deters 
consumers from trading on credence goods markets in the future, thereby creating 
an Akerlof-type of market breakdown (George Akerlof 1970).
In this paper we investigate how informational and institutional restrictions and 
market conditions affect behavior on credence goods markets and how the ineffi-
ciencies arising from the asymmetric information on credence goods markets can be 
contained. Despite the importance of credence goods markets for many day-to-day 
decisions, this is the first large-scale experiment on credence goods. Our experiment 
involves 936 participants and is based on a full 2×2×2×2 factorial design, varying 
the following factors:
• Liability, i.e., the necessity for the seller to provide a good of sufficient quality 
to meet a consumer’s needs (as opposed to an environment where the seller can 
undertreat).
• Verifiability of a seller’s action, i.e., the necessity for the seller to charge for the 
quality provided (as opposed to a setup where the seller can overcharge).
• Reputation building, i.e., giving consumers the possibility to identify their trad-
ing partners (as opposed to an anonymous market).
2 Contributions to the second strand of literature include Timothy J. Feddersen and Thomas W. Gilligan (2001) 
and Soham Baksi and Pinaki Bose (2007). We thank an anonymous referee for asking us to clarify the differences 
between the two strands of literature.
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• Competition, i.e., giving consumers an option to choose from several sellers (as 
opposed to bilateral matching between sellers and consumers).
While under standard assumptions, theoretical analysis predicts that liability or 
verifiability yield efficiency, our experimental results show that liability has a cru-
cial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputa-
tion has little influence on market efficiency, as predicted. Seller competition drives 
down prices and yields maximal trade, as expected. However, it does not lead to 
higher efficiency as long as liability is violated, because sellers frequently provide 
insufficient quality to consumers in this case. Hence, our results suggest that legal 
liability clauses are most suitable to cure many of the inefficiencies associated with 
the provision of credence goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss briefly 
related literature and how our experiment can add insights and thus complement 
other empirical evidence. In Section II we describe the basic model and introduce 
the various conditions under which consumers and sellers might engage in trade. 
Section III presents the experimental design and the theoretical predictions. Section 
IV presents the experimental results. Section V summarizes our main findings and 
discusses some implications for policy as well as for further theoretical analysis of 
credence goods markets.
I.  Related Literature and Rationale for an Experimental Study
Darby and Karni’s (1973) seminal paper on credence goods studies how market 
conditions (the presence or absence of idle capacities, regulation, etc.) and rep-
utation concerns affect the equilibrium amount of fraud, with the latter meaning 
under- and overtreatment, and overcharging. Our paper focuses precisely on these 
problems in credence goods markets. Other theoretical contributions have focused, 
for example, on whether a competitive sampling of opinions makes it attractive for 
experts to provide costly but unobservable diagnostic effort (Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
and Asher Wolinsky 2003), or under which conditions sellers have an incentive to lie 
about the true diagnosis in order to prevent informed customers from asking for the 
right quality of the good from a competing seller (Ingela Alger and Francois Salanié 
2006) or in order to substitute for price discrimination of customers (Yuk-Fai Fong 
2005). These theoretical questions will not be dealt with in this paper, as we will 
abstain from search costs, seller’s diagnosis efforts, or consumer heterogeneity in 
order to keep the model and the experiment as succinct as possible.
The empirical evidence on the problems with credence goods originates mainly 
from the markets for car repairs and for health care services. Wolinsky (1993, 
1995) refers to a survey conducted by the Department of Transportation estimating 
that more than half of car repairs are unnecessary, which is an indication of over-
treatment. Thomas N. Hubbard (1998) shows that car mechanics conduct vehicle 
inspections differently depending on whether the vehicles are on warranty or not. 
Referring to the health care sector, David Hughes and Brian Yule (1992) find that 
the number of cervical cytology treatments is positively correlated with the fee for 
this treatment. Likewise, Jonathan Gruber and Maria Owings (1996) and Gruber, 
John Kim, and Dina Mayzlin (1999) show that the relative frequency of Cesarean 
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deliveries compared to normal child births reacts to the fee differentials of health 
insurance programs for both types of treatments. Toshiaki Iizuka (2007) investigates 
the Japanese drug prescription market where doctors often not only prescribe but 
also dispense drugs. Controlling for patients’ health status, he finds that doctors’ 
prescriptions respond to markup differences, i.e., to monetary incentives that are 
unrelated to warranted medication.3 These studies provide evidence that monetary 
incentives matter for the provision of credence goods. Winand Emons (1997) cites a 
Swiss study reporting that the average person’s probability of receiving one of seven 
major surgical interventions is one third above that of a physician or a member of a 
physician’s family, indicating that a consumer’s (presumed) education or informa-
tion level can also affect the quality of treatment and the likelihood of overtreatment.
Though empirical studies on credence goods markets document the existence of 
inefficiencies, they generally lack a controlled variation of factors that might influ-
ence the level of efficiency. For instance, some papers show that overtreatment is 
happening, without systematically exploring the conditions leading to it (see, e.g., 
the case studies in Wolinsky 1993, 1995; or Emons 1997). Other studies vary only 
one particular aspect that influences the provision of credence goods—for example, 
the price differential between Cesarean section deliveries and normal child births 
(Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin1999)—without controlling for and varying other impor-
tant factors (like liability or verifiability or reputation building of sellers). Of course, 
field data are naturally limited in the number of conditions that can be varied. By 
running a controlled laboratory experiment we are able to systematically vary sev-
eral factors that may affect the provision of credence goods, and identify the effects 
of these factors on sellers’ and consumers’ behavior. Hence, our experiment comple-
ments the empirical literature by allowing for a much broader variation of important 
factors under ceteris-paribus conditions.
Turning to the experimental literature, closest to our paper are two papers by 
Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser, and Jean-Robert Tyran (2007, 2008) who use 
a binary version of the well-known trust game (by Joyce Berg, John W. Dickhaut, 
and Kevin A. McCabe 1995) and interpret it as modeling a market for experience 
goods.4 Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2008) show that experience goods are more effi-
ciently provided when sellers can build up reputation than if this is not the case. 
Yet, it does not make a difference whether buyers can only observe how a particular 
seller has served them in the past or whether they know all past quality choices of 
all sellers in the market. Introducing competition (as compared to a bilateral match-
ing of sellers and consumers), Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2007) find even higher 
efficiency levels than with reputation, because competition lets sellers provide high 
quality in the present to attract consumers also in the future. But taking a trust game 
as an example for an experience goods market limits the analysis of inefficiencies to 
3 Christopher C. Afendulis and Daniel Kessler (2007) show that the integration of diagnosis and treatment has 
raised the treatment costs of coronary artery disease. However, they also find that under some conditions the integra-
tion of diagnosis and treatment can lead to better health outcomes.
4 Experience goods differ from credence goods in several important dimensions. For example, (i) while the 
valuation of a consumer is strictly increasing in quality with experience goods, it is constant whenever the quality is 
sufficient with credence goods; (ii) for given prices a consumer can tell exactly which quality he prefers in the case 
of experience goods, but he does not know it with credence goods; (iii) whereas the quality of the good is unobserv-
able ex ante but perfectly observable ex post with experience goods, it may be observable either ex ante, or ex post, 
or neither ex ante nor ex post with credence goods.
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undertreatment (low quality for a given price) and no market interaction. The frame-
work of credence goods is a much richer one as it adds opportunities for overtreat-
ment and overcharging, both of which constitute persistent problems on credence 
goods markets. It is noteworthy, however, that the setup of Huck, Lünser, and Tyran 
(2007, 2008) is a special case of our more general model. In the final section of 
this paper we will explain in more detail how the experience goods model of Huck, 
Lünser, and Tyran (2007, 2008) is embedded in our model and how our results com-
pare to theirs.
II.  A Simple Model of a Credence Goods Market
A. the Basic Setup
We build our model on the framework presented in Dulleck and Kerschbamer 
(2006).5 Consumers are ex ante identical and know that they need a high quality 
product (qh) with probability h and a low quality product (ql) with probability 1 − h. 
Each consumer (he) is randomly matched with one seller (she) who sets prices ph 
and pl for the high, respectively low, quality (with ph ≥ pl). The seller has costs ch 
for the high quality and cl for the low quality (with ch > cl).
The consumer only knows the prices for the different qualities, but not the type of 
quality that generates the highest surplus (we refer to this as the quality he needs), 
when he makes his decision whether or not to trade with the seller. If the consumer 
decides against engaging in trade with the seller then both the consumer and the 
seller receive an outside option of o ≥ 0. If trade takes place, the seller gets to know 
which quality the consumer needs. Then she provides one of the two qualities and 
charges one of the two prices. Consumers in need of the low quality ql are suf-
ficiently treated in any case (receiving either ql or qh). However, if the consumer 
needs the high quality qh, then only qh is sufficient. A sufficient quality yields a 
value v > 0 for the consumer, an insufficient quality yields a value of zero. In case 
of an interaction, a consumer earns the value from being served with a particular 
quality (which is either v or zero) minus the price to be paid, while a seller receives 
the price charged minus the cost of the provided quality (cl if ql has been provided, 
ch otherwise).
In the following, we extend this basic setup by considering, first, liability and 
verifiability as institutional, respectively informational, restrictions on the seller’s 
action space and, second, reputation building and seller competition as two impor-
tant features of market conditions.
5 In order to keep the exposition as succinct as possible, we present the basic model as it will be implemented in 
the experiment. Of course, more general specifications would be possible, such as varying the value of the outside 
option with the type of player (seller versus consumer) or the value from receiving a sufficient quality with the 
quality needed by the consumer (high versus low quality), or considering strictly positive diagnosis costs (which 
we set at zero here). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) discuss various generalizations, showing that many of them 
do not affect the theoretical results qualitatively. Hence, we use the simpler framework, which also prevents us from 
making the experiment too complicated for participants.
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B. Adding institutional Restrictions: Liability and Verifiability
Liability in credence goods markets implies the requirement that sellers provide 
a quality that is sufficient to solve the consumer’s problem. Thus, liability pre-
vents undertreatment, but it does not preclude overtreatment and/or overcharging. 
Verifiability means that consumers can observe and verify ex post the quality that 
has been provided by the seller (without knowing, however, whether this quality 
was needed). As a consequence, verifiability prevents overcharging, but it does not 
preclude under- and/or overtreatment.
The factorial combination of liability and verifiability creates four different insti-
tutional conditions that imply different sets of available actions for the seller (see 
Figure 1 for the sequence of actions and the resulting monetary payoffs).
 (i) In condition N (no liability/no verifiability) the seller is completely free 
in her choice of product quality and in which of the two posted prices she 
charges.
 (ii) In condition L (liability/no verifiability) the seller must provide a sufficient 
quality. However, she is allowed to charge any of her posted prices.
 (iii) In condition V (no liability/verifiability) the seller is not restricted in her 
choice of quality, but she must charge the price of the quality actually 
provided.
 (iv) In condition LV (liability/verifiability) the seller must provide sufficient 
quality and charge the price of the quality actually provided.
N (no liability / no verifiability)
seller posts prices
customer enters or not
nature determines
severity of problem
         seller treats
seller
charges
seller posts prices
customer enters or not
nature determines
severity of problem
         seller treats
seller
charges
 
inout
outside option
out
outside option
out
outside option
out
outside option
 
L (liability / no verifiability)
 
in
 
 
V (no liability / verifiability)
 
seller posts prices
customer enters or not
nature determines
severity of problem
         seller treats
seller
charges
seller posts prices
customer enters or not
nature determines
severity of problem
         seller treats
seller
charges
 
 
in
ph phpl pl
h
 
LV(liability / verifiability)
 
in
 
qh qhql ql
1–h
(ph–ch,v–ph) (ph–ch,v–ph)(pl–cl,–pl) (pl–cl,v–pl) (ph–ch,v–ph) (ph–ch,v–ph) (pl–cl,v–pl)
ph, pl
ph ph ph phplpl plpl
h
qh qhql ql
1–h
(ph–ch,v–ph) (ph–ch,v–ph) (pl–ch,v–pl)(ph–cl,–ph) (pl–cl,–pl)(pl–ch,v–pl) (pl–cl,v–pl)(ph–cl,v–ph)
ph, pl
ph ph phpl plpl
h
qh qh ql
1–h
(ph–ch,v–ph) (ph–ch,v–ph) (pl–ch,v–pl)(pl–ch,v–pl) (pl–cl,v–pl)(ph–cl,v–ph)
ph, pl
ph ph pl
h
qh qh ql
1–h
ph, pl
Figure 1. The Four Institutional Conditions
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C. Adding market Conditions: Reputation and Competition
The basic setup places two particular restrictions on consumers. First, consum-
ers cannot identify their (past) trading partners. Second, consumers do not have 
a choice between different potential trading partners, because they are bilaterally 
matched with one seller only. The first restriction is lifted by considering a reputa-
tion condition in which sellers are identifiable, such that a consumer can keep track 
of his past experience with a particular seller (but without knowing how this seller 
has treated other consumers).6 The second restriction is removed by considering a 
competition condition where consumers can choose among several sellers, know-
ing the prices posted by them. In the competition condition the matching becomes 
endogenous. We assume that consumers face zero costs from comparing the dif-
ferent sellers’ prices. Also, there are no capacity constraints, meaning that sellers 
may serve up to four consumers, while some sellers may serve none. A factorial 
combination of allowing for reputation building and seller competition yields the 
following four conditions of market structure:
 (i) In condition B (for “baseline”; no competition/no reputation) the matching 
of consumers and sellers is random and one-to-one, and consumers cannot 
identify their trading partners.
 (ii) In condition R (no competition/reputation) consumers can identify their 
(past) trading partners, but they cannot choose among trading partners 
because the matching of consumers and sellers is random and one-to-one, as 
in condition B.
 (iii) In condition C (competition/no reputation) consumers can choose among 
several sellers, but they cannot identify their trading partners.
 (iv) In condition CR (competition/reputation) consumers can choose among dif-
ferent sellers, and they can identify them.
Combining institutional and market conditions yields 16 different conditions for 
the interaction between consumers and sellers on credence goods markets. Table 1 
summarizes the different conditions and how they are characterized with respect 
to the presence or absence of liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition. 
The abbreviations in Table 1 for the 16 conditions are of the form X/Y, where 
X ∈ {B,  R,  C,  CR}, and Y ∈ {N,  L, V,  LV}. For example, C/LV denotes the 
 condition with seller competition, where sellers can not build up reputation, but 
where both liability and verifiability apply. In the following we will often refer to 
6 Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2008) do not observe differences between conditions where consumers get to know 
only their own history with a particular seller and where they are informed about a particular seller’s past history 
with all of her consumers. In reality, consumers can always be sure about their own experience, but only rarely 
observe how sellers have treated other consumers. Hence, we have opted for the information condition where con-
sumers do not know how others were treated. Sellers can never identify consumers in our model, because we are 
primarily interested in the effect of seller reputation.
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a set of  conditions by using a single element of the tuples X/Y defined above. For 
instance, a reference to the set R includes R/N, R/L, R/V, and R/LV.
III.  Experimental Design and Predictions
In this section we present, first, the experimental treatments and parameters. Then 
we proceed with more details on the experimental procedure and the matching pro-
tocol used, and conclude with the theoretical predictions. Our choice of the experi-
mental parameters is motivated by our research interest in the effects of liability, 
verifiability, reputation and competition. The theoretical literature shows that both 
verifiability and liability are effective means to guarantee efficient trade in credence 
goods markets (see Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). To test the equivalence of 
both factors we have determined the experimental parameters such that the maxi-
mal trade volume and market efficiency is predicted by standard theory when either 
liability (in B/L) or verifiability (in B/V) holds. To see whether the prevalence of 
liability or verifiability makes a difference on trade in credence goods markets, the 
parameters imply market breakdown when neither liability nor verifiability applies 
(in condition B/N). This yields the sharpest contrast for predictions. The parameters 
are also chosen in order to check whether reputation has an effect on trade and mar-
ket efficiency even when it should not. Finally, in the absence of liability and verifi-
ability, the parameters yield almost maximal trade—but not full market efficiency, 
when competition applies (in C/N). Adding reputation to competition (in CR/N) 
keeps the trade volume almost at the maximum, but also admits equilibria with 
almost full efficiency. This allows for a crisp test of whether competition combined 
with reputation can be considered a substitute for verifiability or liability.
A. Experimental treatments and parameters
The 16 conditions of interaction between consumers and sellers in Table 1 consti-
tute a 2×2×2×2 factorial design with 16 different experimental treatments. In each 
treatment we let the consumer’s probability of needing the high quality be h = 0.5, 
and the value of receiving a sufficient quality be v = 10. The costs of providing 
the low (high) quality is cl = 2 (ch = 6). The prices posted by the sellers, pl and ph 
(with pl ≤ ph), have to be chosen in integer numbers from the interval {1, ..., 11}. 
The outside option if no trade takes place is set to o = 1.6, both for the seller and 
the consumer.
Table 1—The 16 Conditions of Interaction
Market condition
B R C CR
Institutional condition
(no competition/
no reputation)
(no competition/
reputation)
(competition/
no reputation)
(competition/
reputation)
N (no liability/no verifiability) B/N R/N C/N CR/N
L (liability/no verifiability) B/L R/L C/L CR/L
V (no liability/verifiability) B/V R/V C/V CR/V
LV (liability/verifiability) B/LV R/LV C/LV CR/LV
534 thE AmERiCAn EConomiC REViEW ApRiL 2011
The stage game is repeated for 16 periods, which makes the matching protocol of 
subjects important. In all treatments we use matching groups of eight subjects each, 
which is common knowledge. Four subjects in each matching group are in the role 
of consumers, and four in the role of sellers. The assignment to roles is randomly 
determined at the beginning of the experiment, and roles are kept fixed throughout 
the entire experiment.
In the treatments without reputation (i.e., in sets B and C) it must not be possible 
for sellers to build up reputation in the course of the repeated interaction. This pre-
cludes the use of a partner matching (in which a seller would be matched with the 
same consumer in all 16 periods). Therefore, we use a stranger matching in which 
consumers and sellers are randomly rematched after each period.7
In the treatments with competition (i.e., in sets C and CR) the four sellers have to 
post prices first, and each of the four consumers is informed about the prices of all 
four sellers. Only then consumers have to choose with which seller, if any, to trade. 
Note that in set C consumers can not identify their (potential) trading partners. In 
order to make that more transparent, we stress in the experimental instructions (see 
online supplement S3) that the order of presenting the four sellers’ prices on the 
screen will be randomly determined in each period.
In the treatments with reputation (i.e., in sets R and CR) consumers can keep 
track of their past experience with a particular seller through fixing the sellers’ IDs. 
The feedback consists of information on which seller they have traded with in a 
particular period, which prices have been posted in that period, and what has been 
the consumer’s profit from trade.
In all treatments consumers are informed after each period about their payoff. 
From the latter, consumers can infer whether they have received a good of sufficient 
quality or not and which price has been charged. Consumers are not informed about 
which quality was actually needed, although they can infer this information in case 
of undertreatment. In treatments without verifiability, the information feedback is 
also silent on which quality was provided.
B. Experimental procedure
All experimental sessions were run computerized (using zTree; Urs Fischbacher 
2007) and recruiting was done with ORSEE (Ben Greiner 2004). A total of 936 
undergraduate students participated in the experiment, with none of them partici-
pating in more than one session. In all treatments we ran three sessions, except 
for treatment B/N with four sessions. The number of participants per session was 
always 16 in treatments of sets R, C, and CR, while the number was 16, 24, or 32 in 
treatments of set B. All sessions started with an extensive description of the game. 
All parameters as well as the matching procedure were made common knowledge 
to all participants by reading them aloud. Before the start of an experimental ses-
sion, participants had to answer a set of control questions correctly to ensure that 
7 Of course, the probability of meeting a particular seller again is one-quarter, meaning that implicit reputa-
tion formation that encompasses the whole matching group is feasible. However, the stranger matching precludes 
reputation formation of individual sellers, which is our main concern and distinctive feature in comparison to the 
treatments with opportunities for reputation building (i.e., to sets R and CR).
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they had fully understood the instructions. For every session we invited four sub-
jects more than needed in order to make sure that we got enough subjects answer-
ing all questions correctly. Once the number of subjects required to start a session 
had answered all questions correctly, the four remaining subjects were paid 4 euros 
and dismissed. The average session length, including instructions and control ques-
tions, was 1.5 hours. Participants received 6 points as starting endowment, with an 
exchange rate of 4 points for 1 euro. At the end of the experiment they were paid 
privately and earned on average 14 euros.
C. predictions
In the following analysis we assume that both sellers and consumers are ratio-
nal, risk neutral and only interested in their own monetary payoff, and that this 
fact is common knowledge. The equilibrium concept we apply is Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium and our main focus will be on symmetric equilibria. Note that in the 
treatments without reputation (i.e., in sets B and C) the predictions for the finitely 
repeated game are the same as the predictions for the underlying stage game. This 
is not the case in the treatments with reputation (i.e., in sets R and CR) where con-
sumers can keep track of their past experience with a particular seller. The online 
supplement S1 contains the detailed proofs of our predictions. Here we present only 
the equilibrium predictions—and a short rationale for it—in order to keep the expo-
sition succinct. Table 2 summarizes all predictions by indicating whether trade takes 
place, whether undertreatment or overtreatment occurs, and which price vectors are 
posted and which prices are charged by the sellers in equilibrium.
Prediction B: the effects of Liability and Verifiability (Set B).—
  (i)  in B/N the market breaks down. the reason is that in B/N sellers provide 
the low, but charge for the high quality under each price vector. Anticipating 
this, consumers would enter the market only if ph ≤ 3. But with such a low ph 
even cheating sellers earn less than the value of their outside option (because 
ph − cl ≤ 1 < o = 1.6).
  (ii)  in B/L the market generates the maximal trade volume and full efficiency. 
the argument is that in B/L undertreatment is impossible and overtreatment 
is dominated by overcharging. thus, sellers always provide the appropriate 
quality 8 and charge for the high quality under each price vector. Anticipating 
this, consumers are willing to trade as long as ph ≤ 8. With ph = 8 and 
expected costs for providing the appropriate quality of 4 (= (1 − h) cl + h ch) 
a seller’s expected profit is 4, which is larger than the value of her outside 
option. thus, sellers post a price vector with ph = 8, while pl is indeterminate 
(because it will never be charged when pl < ph).
  (iii)  in B/V the market generates the maximal trade volume and full efficiency. 
here the argument is that in B/V sellers provide the appropriate qual-
ity under equal markup vectors, but always the low (high) quality under 
8 Here and throughout the paper appropriate quality refers to providing qh if the consumer needs the high quality 
and providing ql if the consumer needs the low quality; undertreatment refers to providing ql when the consumer 
needs qh; overtreatment refers to providing qh when the consumer needs ql.
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 undertreatment (overtreatment) price vectors.9 Anticipating this, consumers 
are willing to trade under an equal markup vector if and only if ph ≤ 10, 
under an undertreatment vector if and only if pl ≤ 3, and under an overtreat-
ment vector if and only if ph ≤ 8. thus, sellers post the equal markup vector 
{6, 10} which yields the highest profits for them.
9 Note the following definition of price vectors: an equal markup price vector is defined as one that satisfies ph 
− pl = ch − cl = 4. An undertreatment price vector satisfies ph − pl < ch − cl = 4. An overtreatment price vector 
is characterized by ph − pl > ch − cl = 4.
Table 2 —Predictions on Trade and Pricing-, Provision- and Charging-Policy  
(Symmetric perfect Bayesian Equilibria)
Market conditions
B R C CR
Institutional 
condition
(no competition/
no reputation)
(no competition/ 
reputation)
(competition/ 
no reputation)
(competition/ 
reputation)
N B/N R/N C/N CR/N
 (no liability / 
  no verifiability)
[1] no trade no trade mixed eq.: high prob. 
on {n.d, 3}
mixed as in C/N; 
or {n.d.,5} in earlier 
rounds
[2] no trade no trade undertreatment undertreatment or 
efficient provision
[3] no trade no trade overcharging overcharging or  
honest charging
L B/L R/L C/L CR/L
 (liability / 
  no verifiability)
[1] {n.d., 8} {n.d., 8} mixed eq.: high prob. 
on {n.d, 5}, low prob. 
on {n.d., 6}
mixed as in C/L; 
or {n.d., 5}
[2] efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision
[3] overcharging overcharging overcharging overcharging or  
honest charging
V B/V R/V C/V CR/V
 (no liability / 
  verifiability)
[1] {6, 10} {6, 10} mixed eq.: high prob.  
on {3, 7}, low on
{4, 8}
mixed as in C/V; 
or {3, 7}
[2] efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision
[3] honest charging honest charging honest charging honest charging
LV B/LV R/LV C/LV CR/LV
 (liability / 
  verifiability)
[1] {6, 10},{7, 9}, or 
{8, 8}
{6, 10},{7, 9}, or 
{8, 8}
mixed eq.: high prob. 
on {5, 6} or {4, 7} mixed as in C/LV; or {4, 5} or {3, 6}
[2] efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision efficient provision
[3] honest charging honest charging honest charging honest charging
Legend
[1] prediction on interaction and (if applicable) on posted prices
{x, y} seller posts price x for ql and price y for qh.
n.d. not determined in theoretical solution, but pl has to satisfy pl ≤ ph.
mixed eq. equilibrium in mixed strategies
prob. probability
[2] prediction on provision policy
undertr. undertreatment
effic. p. efficient provision, i.e., providing the quality that is needed
[3] prediction on charging policy
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  (iv)  in B/LV the market generates the maximal trade volume and full efficiency. 
the argument is similar to the one in the previous paragraph, except that 
equal markup vectors and undertreatment vectors yield the same provision 
policy and therefore—for given expected prices—the same volume of trade. 
thus, sellers post the equal markup vector {6, 10} or an undertreatment vec-
tor that yields the same profit in expectation.
Summarizing Prediction B we observe that if both liability and verifiability are 
violated, then the market breaks down. As soon as either L or V (or both) apply, 
however, sellers have an incentive to post prices which induce them to provide the 
appropriate quality, making it profitable for consumers to enter the market in B/L, 
B/V, and B/LV. Verifiability and liability are equally effective in inducing full 
market efficiency, even though the price vectors posted by sellers in equilibrium 
differ.
Prediction r: the effects of reputation (Set r).—Reputation itself does not 
affect the predicted behavior of sellers and consumers, since the stage game has 
a unique equilibrium and the repeated game a fixed, commonly known end date. 
hence, prediction B also applies to set R.
Prediction c: the effects of competition (Set c)10.—
  (i)  in C/N the volume of trade is almost 100 percent although sellers still pro-
vide low quality and charge for high quality under each price vector. the 
possibility of trade even when liability and verifiability are violated in C/N 
is a major difference to predictions B and R, where market breakdown was 
predicted under condition N. the intuition for (almost) maximal trade in 
C/N runs as follows. Although sellers can still not be induced to provide 
the high quality, each seller can now serve more than one consumer. the 
latter fact implies that there is now room for prices that are profitable for 
both parties of the interaction. in equilibrium, each seller posts {n.d, 3}11 
with probability x = 0.844 and a price vector which is unattractive for con-
sumers (due to ph > 3) with probability 1 − x.12 if at least one seller posts 
{n.d, 3} then all consumers are (under)treated, otherwise (with probability 
(1 − x)4 = 0.0006) there is no trade. note that the increase in the volume of 
trade (compared to B/N) translates only into a minor increase in efficiency 
(less than 1/7 of the potential gains from trade are realized), as consumers 
are always undertreated in equilibrium.
  (ii)  in C/L the provision and charging policy and the volume of trade are the 
same as in B/L, but prices are lower. in equilibrium each seller posts {n.d., 5} 
with probability x = 0.839 and {n.d., 6} with probability 1 − x. Consumers 
trade with the seller with the lowest ph.
10 As mentioned earlier our focus is on symmetric equilibria. In the price-posting stage of set C there are also 
asymmetric equilibria. Because there is no obvious way for sellers to coordinate on a specific asymmetric equilib-
rium we regard such equilibria as less plausible, and thus mention them only here in a footnote. The full proof of 
Prediction C (in online supplement S1) includes the asymmetric equilibria in conditions C/L, C/V, and C/LV.
11 The abbreviation “n.d.” means theoretically not determined. Yet, pl has to satisfy pl ≤ ph, of course.
12 We round the probabilities to three decimals here.
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  (iii)  in C/V the provision and charging policy and the volume of trade are the 
same as in B/V, but prices are lower. in equilibrium each seller posts the 
equal markup vector {3, 7} with probability x = 0.839 and {4, 8} with prob-
ability 1 − x. A consumer’s trading decision does not only depend on both 
prices, pl and ph, but also on the kind of price vector posted.
  (iv)  in C/LV the provision and charging policy and the volume of trade are the 
same as in B/LV, but prices are lower. in equilibrium each seller posts either 
{4, 5} or {3, 6} with probability x = 0.132, either {5, 5} or {4, 6} or {3, 7} with 
probability y = 0.280, and either {5, 6} or {4, 7} with probability 1 − x − y. 
Within the three sets of price vectors, both sellers and consumers are indiffer-
ent to which price vector is accepted if trade takes place.
In all treatments of set C it is important to note that the gains from trade shift 
completely from the seller’s side (as in treatments without competition) to the con-
sumer’s side.
Prediction cr: the combined effects of reputation and competition (Set 
cr).—prediction C remains an equilibrium prediction also in set CR. however, 
in CR/N there are additional equilibria where (some) sellers post {n.d, 5} 
(instead of {n.d., 3}) in the first nine periods and in which consumers enter the 
market, because they anticipate (correctly) that they will get the appropriate quality 
with sufficiently high probability. in these equilibria, adding reputation to competi-
tion increases the efficiency of trade (in comparison to C/N) because consumers 
can now costlessly reward a seller who has treated them appropriately in the past, 
simply by buying from this (and not from another) seller again, even in the last peri-
ods of the experiment where sellers are expected to act opportunistically in any case.
IV.  Experimental Results
In line with the presentation of the model and the predictions, Section IVA deals 
with the impact of liability and verifiability in set B, and Section IVB examines the 
effects of reputation and competition in sets R, C, and CR. Section IVC presents 
an econometric estimation of the effects of liability, verifiability, reputation, and 
competition.
A. Aggregate Behavior in Set B (Baseline)
reSuLt 1 (on the role of Liability and Verifiability): the market does not break 
down in B/N. Liability has a significantly positive impact on the frequency of trade 
and on the degree of efficiency, as theory predicts. however, verifiability has no 
significant impact on those variables, contrary to the theoretical prediction. in fact, 
aggregate behavior with respect to trade volume and market efficiency does not dif-
fer between B/N and B/V, showing that verifiability is an ineffective means to make 
credence goods markets more efficient.
Table 3 presents aggregate data for set B. The overall pattern emerging from 
Table 3 reveals the following results that add further details to our Result 1.
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  (i)  trade volume and efficiency. The first row in Table 3 shows that the average 
relative frequency of trade between consumers and sellers is only around 50 
percent in treatments without liability (B/N, B/V), but significantly higher 
and above 80 percent in treatments with liability (B/L, B/LV).13 Looking at 
efficiency in the second row yields a similar picture.14 Efficiency is below 20 
percent without liability, but significantly higher and above 80 percent with 
liability. Hence, Prediction B is basically correct as far as the importance of 
liability for trade volume and efficiency of credence goods markets is con-
cerned. However, verifiability fails in the experiment.
  (ii)  undertreatment. The third row of Table 3 reveals that, apart from the low 
trade volume, the high undertreatment rates (of 53 percent in B/N, respec-
tively 60 percent in B/V) are responsible for the low efficiency in B/N and 
B/V. Undertreatment does not differ significantly between B/N and B/V. 
In equilibrium, undertreatment should not occur in B/V if sellers post equal 
markup prices. Such prices are posted only very seldom, however, as noted 
under item (v) below. Rather, the large majority of sellers post undertreatment 
price vectors in B/V which provide an incentive for undertreatment. Looking 
at individual behavior over all 16 periods of the experiment we observe that 
a considerable fraction of sellers behave persistently in an egoistic way. In 
treatment B/N we observe 13 out of 48 sellers (29 percent) who always pro-
vide the low quality (and charge the high price) across the 16 periods of the 
experiment. Likewise, 17 out of 48 sellers (39 percent) always provide the 
low quality in treatment B/V. Nevertheless, it is interesting and important to 
note that even in treatments B/N and B/V a nonnegligible fraction of sellers 
(27 percent in B/N, respectively 16 percent in B/V) provide the appropriate 
quality across all 16 periods. Hence, a substantial fraction of sellers are hon-
est, thus running counter to the standard prediction of undertreating consum-
ers whenever possible.
  (iii)  overtreatment. This form of market inefficiency occurs in between 3 percent 
and 6 percent of observations in set B (see fourth row of Table 3) and is there-
fore no substantial problem in any of the treatments. Note that overtreatment 
need not be a mistake of the seller in treatments with verifiability, since under 
overtreatment price vectors providing the high quality (instead of the low 
quality) increases the seller’s profit (by definition). The latter type of price 
vector is very rare, though, as indicated in item (v) below. Looking at how 
overtreatment in treatment B/V changes in the price difference ph − pl, we 
observe an inverse relationship (as expected under the assumption that behav-
ior responds to monetary incentives). For instance, in B/V the overtreatment 
rate is 0 percent for vectors {7, 8} and {8, 8}, but it increases monotonically 
with a decrease in the low price, reaching 38 percent for vector {4, 8}. Note 
that the price vector {4, 8} is an equal markup vector, where standard theory 
predicts appropriate treatment. Looking only at equal markup vectors (which 
13 In Table 3 (and Table 4 below) we check for significant differences between two treatments each by using 
two-sided nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-tests (with a matching group of eight subjects as one independent 
observation).
14 Efficiency is measured as the ratio of the average actual profit per subject to the average maximally possible 
profit per subject, where the outside option is disregarded for both measures.
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are posted only in about 4 percent of the cases; see point (v) below) we 
observe that they all induce a considerable amount of overtreatment in B/V 
(the overtreatment rate under equal markup vectors is 40 percent while the 
average overtreatment rate in B/V is only 5 percent).15 We will discuss this 
evidence in the final section of this paper.
  (iv)  overcharging. Overcharging occurs whenever the low quality is provided, but 
the high quality is charged for, given that ph > pl is satisfied. Overcharging 
is predicted to occur in 100 percent of cases when sellers post price vectors 
with pl < ph in treatments without verifiability (see prediction B). In B/N, 
the overcharging rate is, with 88 percent, actually rather close to the predicted 
100 percent, and it is only insignificantly smaller in B/L. In both treatments 
we find that overcharging is increasing in the price difference ph − pl which is 
consistent with the assumption that experts respond to monetary incentives.16
15 For further details on how overtreatment (or undertreatment) depends on the endogenously chosen price vec-
tors see the (extended) working paper version of this paper (Dulleck, Kerschbamer, and Sutter 2009).
16 Holding the high price constant at ph = 8 in B/N (B/L) the relative frequency of overcharging is 75 percent 
(65 percent) when the low price is pl = 7, but increases monotonically to 100 percent (100 percent) with a decrease 
in the low price down to pl = 3.
Table 3 —Overview of Results in BASELINE (set B)
Averages per period
B/N
(no liability/
no verifiability)
B/L
(liability/
no verifiability)
B/V
(no liability/ 
verifiability)
B/LV
(liability/
verifiability)
Trade1 0.45a,c 0.82a,d 0.50d,f 0.82c,f
Efficiency2 0.18a,c 0.84a,d 0.16d,f 0.81c,f
Undertreatment1, 3 0.53 − 0.60 −
Overtreatment1, 4 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03
Overcharging1, 5 0.88 0.75 − −
pl with trade 4.67a,b,c 5.94a,e 5.84b,f 6.88c,e,f
pl without trade 5.17a,b,c 6.12a,e 6.21b,f 7.46c,e,f
ph with trade 7.28a,b,c 8.00a,d 7.70b,d,f 7.96c,f
ph without trade 7.91a,c 8.77a,d 7.82d,f 8.83c,f
Actually charged price 7.08a,b,c 7.77a,d,e 6.44b,d,f 7.46c,e,f
Profits sellers6 2.69a,c 3.44a,d,e 2.58d,f 3.10c,e,f
Profits consumers6 1.00a,c 2.12a,d,e 1.06d,f 2.37c,e,f
Most prominent price {6,8} 23% {6,8} 24% {6,8} 38% {7,8} 35%
vectors {4,8} 11% {7,8} 23% {7,8} 13% {8,8} 27%
{5,7} 7% {8,8} 13% {6,7} 11% {6,8} 17%
Number of subjects 96 96 88 80
1 relative frequency
2  calculated as (actual average profit − outside option) / (maximum possible average profit −
outside option)
3 consumer needs qh, but seller provides ql.
4 consumer needs ql, but seller provides qh.
5 seller provides ql, but charges ph (with ph > pl and consumer needing ql)
6 in experimental currency units
Mann-Whitney U-tests for pairwise differences between treatments (with matching groups of 
8 subjects as one independent observation)
a B/N versus B/L (p < 0.05)
b B/N versus B/V (p < 0.05)
c B/N versus B/LV (p < 0.05)
d B/L versus B/V (p < 0.05)
e B/L versus B/LV (p < 0.05)
f B/V versus B/LV (p < 0.05)
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  (v)  pricing. Across all four treatments, the price vector {6, 8} is the most promi-
nent one, capturing about 25 percent of all observations (see bottom part of 
Table 3). This price vector would split the gains from trade equally between 
sellers and consumers—if and only if sellers always provided the appropriate 
quality and always charged for the actually provided quality. However, those 
two conditions are most often not satisfied. The second most popular price-
vector is {7, 8} in about 17 percent of the overall observations. Both price 
vectors are undertreatment vectors, i.e., price vectors that provide incentives 
for sellers to undertreat consumers in treatments with verifiability. The equal 
markup vectors predicted in B/V occur in only about 4 percent of cases. In 
these treatments we find about 95 percent of price vectors to be of the under-
treatment type, which is inconsistent with prediction B. Almost no overtreat-
ment price vectors are chosen—in that respect standard theory can explain 
the low prevalence of overtreatment observed in the experiment. Looking at 
the price vectors when trade takes place, it seems noteworthy that more than 
80 percent of price vectors satisfy ph = 8 in B/L, which is the point predic-
tion from prediction B.
  (vi)  profits. From the lower half of Table 3 it becomes clear that the average prof-
its for consumers in treatments without liability are below the available out-
side option. Hence, consumers would have benefited from staying away from 
the credence goods market in these treatments. Only when liability applies, 
consumers’ profits exceed the value of the outside option. As expected, the 
bilateral matching allocates market power to sellers (by allowing them to 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer), and hence they earn significantly more than 
consumers in each single treatment.
While Table 3 presents overall averages, Figure 2 illustrates the development 
of key variables across the 16 periods of the experiment. Panel A shows that the 
relative frequency of trade is rather stable, and high, if liability holds (in B/L and 
B/LV), while it has a steady downward trend whenever liability is violated (in 
B/N and B/V). This downward trend is due to consumers learning that under-
treatment happens and that it has large costs for them. While a consumer’s rela-
tive frequency of interaction with a seller in period t is 57 percent after having 
received a sufficient quality in period t − 1, it is only 32 percent after having been 
undertreated in period t − 1 (p < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed ranks test using data from 
B/N and B/V). Hence, consumers are rather credulous as long as they receive suf-
ficient quality, but react strongly to the experience of undertreatment. Of course, 
the learning process is rather slow (see the negative, but relatively small estimated 
coefficient for “period” in the estimations reported in Section IVC), because con-
sumers who happen to need the low quality cannot experience undertreatment and 
because a considerable fraction of sellers provide the appropriate quality also if the 
high quality is needed.
Panels B to D of Figure 2 display the time path of undertreatment, overtreatment, 
and overcharging, showing that overcharging seems to increase over time, while 
there is no clear time trend for under- and overtreatment. Panels E and F show the 
development of (accepted) prices pl and ph, indicating that consumers are willing 
(and have) to pay the highest prices in conditions where liability applies. This means 
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that an institutional safeguard against cheating in credence goods markets has its 
price for consumers.
B. Aggregate Behavior in Sets R, C, and CR
reSuLt 2 (on the role of reputation and competition):
Set r. An opportunity for reputation building (without competition) increases the 
volume of trade and decreases the frequency of overcharging when neither liabil-
ity nor verifiability applies (in R/N), while in all other treatments reputation has 
no significant effect on behavior. the latter finding is consistent with prediction R, 
whereas the former is not.
Set c. Competition (without an opportunity for reputation building) decreases 
prices and increases the volume of trade significantly, independently of whether lia-
bility and/or verifiability applies or not. the impact of competition on trade  volume 
in C/N (compared to B/N) is consistent with prediction C. overall efficiency is 
hardly affected by the introduction of seller competition, which is also in line with 
prediction C.
Set cr. Adding an opportunity for reputation building to competition has virtu-
ally no effect in comparison to behavior when only competition applies, except for 
B/N B/L B/V B/LV
B/N B/L B/V B/LV
B/N B/L B/V B/LV
[A] Relative frequency of trade
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0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Period
[B] Average rate of undertreatment
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0
Period
[D] Average rate of overcharging
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[C] Average rate of overtreatment
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[E] Average accepted price pl
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[F] Average accepted price ph
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Figure 2. Trade, Provision, Charging, and Pricing Policy in Set B
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condition N where adding R to C increases the volume of trade (without signifi-
cantly affecting efficiency, however).
Table 4 presents aggregate data for all 16 experimental treatments. Comparing 
across the four columns within each of the four panels N, L, V, or LV allows checking 
how behavior is affected by competition and reputation, holding liability and verifi-
ability constant. Again we use two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests to indicate significant 
differences between two conditions, each within a given panel. The overall pattern 
emerging from Table 4 adds the following details to Result 2:
 (i)  trade volume and efficiency. Reputation has a significant impact on trade vol-
ume when neither liability nor verifiability applies (63 percent in R/N versus 
45 percent in B/N). In all other cases, reputation in itself has no impact on 
trade volume or market efficiency. The latter finding is consistent with pre-
diction R, while the former is not. Competition increases the trade volume 
significantly in each single panel of Table 4 (comparing B/X to C/X, where 
X ∊ {N, L, V, LV}). The very high trade volume (ranging from 73 percent in 
C/N to 99 percent in C/L) is largely consistent with prediction C. But the 
impact of competition on efficiency is less clear cut. In particular, efficiency 
is not increased by introducing C when liability and verifiability are both 
violated, which is roughly consistent with prediction C. In all other cases the 
impact of competition on market efficiency is—on average—positive, albeit 
only significant in set V. Note that our efficiency definition takes into account 
that the scope of payoffs is larger with competition since one seller can treat 
several consumers, while sellers without a consumer still get the outside 
option. In particular, we subtract the outside option from both the actual aver-
age profit and the maximum possible average profit when calculating relative 
efficiency. This approach keeps the efficiency measure perfectly comparable 
between treatments with competition and those without competition.17
  (ii)  undertreatment. In set N the undertreatment rate increases in the course of the 
experiment, while there is no discernible development in set V (see the online 
Supplement S2). In the latter set reputation appears to reduce the undertreat-
ment rate. Competition, however, has no clear-cut effects on undertreatment.
  (iii)  overtreatment. When verifiability applies both competition and reputation 
increase overtreatment while there is no such effect when verifiability is 
 violated, as can be seen in Table 4. Recall from Section IVA that overtreat-
ment need not be a mistake when verifiability applies.
17 Another (and probably more elegant) way of settling this issue would have been to use an unrestricted random 
matching instead of the random one-to-one matching between sellers and consumers in the treatments without com-
petition. This would have made it possible that sellers can also treat up to four consumers in sets B and R, which 
would have kept experimental conditions even more similar between treatments with and without competition (we 
thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this interesting alternative design which has been used in 
Huck, Lünser, and Tyran 2007, for instance). However, we do not believe that the degree of market concentration 
has an important behavioral impact since otherwise sellers’ provision and charging behavior should strongly depend 
on the number of consumers they have in a given period. But this is not what we observe in the experiment. For 
instance, the relative frequency of undertreatment is 54 percent on average if sellers have one consumer, 62 percent 
on average for sellers with two consumers, and 45 percent for sellers with three consumers (p = 0.21; Kruskal-
Wallis test). Likewise, the relative frequency of overcharging is 61 percent with one consumer, 59 percent with two 
consumers, 62 percent with three consumers, and 44 percent with four consumers (the latter being a very rare case) 
(p = 0.34; Kruskal-Wallis test, using all observations from sets C and CR).
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  (iv)  overcharging. Reputation reduces the overcharging rate in set N. While over-
charging occurs in 88 percent of cases in B/N, it is reduced to about 60 
percent of cases when reputation applies in R/N and CR/N. These findings 
indicate clearly that reputation building of sellers is beneficial for consumers 
as far as their risk of being overcharged is concerned. But if liability applies, 
reputation and competition do not influence the overcharging rate (see set 
Table 4—Overview of Results across All Treatments
N L
(no liability / no verifiability) (liability / no verifiability)
Averages per period B/N R/N C/N CR/N B/L R/L C/L CR/L
Trade on cons. side1 0.45a,b,c 0.63a,d,e 0.73b,d,f 0.85c,e,f 0.82b,c 0.76d,e 0.99b,d 0.98c,e
Avg. # of consumers2 1 1 1.54 1.54 1 1 2.29 2.28
Trade on seller side3 0.45a,c 0.63a,d 0.47d,f 0.55c,f 0.82b,c 0.76d,e 0.43b,d 0.43c,e
Efficiency4 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.84 0.72d,e 0.92d 0.96e
Undertreatment5 0.53 0.56 0.73 0.64 − − − −
Overtreatment6 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.03c 0.08 0.06 0.13c
Overcharging7 0.88a,c 0.62a 0.79 0.62c 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.66
pl with trade 4.67b,c 5.09d,e 3.19b,d 3.31c,e 5.94b,c 5.47d,e 3.36b,d 3.06c,e
pl without trade 5.17b 5.72d 4.16b,d 4.65 6.12b 6.07d 4.13b,d 4.23
ph with trade 7.28b,c 7.60d,e 5.73b,d 6.33c,e 8.00b,d 8.02d,e 5.72b,d 5.76c,e
ph without trade 7.91 8.09 7.55 7.60 8.77b 9.11d 7.64b,d 7.55
Actually paid price 7.08b,c 7.14d,e 5.35b,d 5.80c,e 7.77b,c 7.56d,e 5.42b,d 5.24c,e
Profits sellers8 2.69a 3.21a,d 2.36d 2.65 3.44b,c 2.98d,e 1.23b,d 1.19c,e
Profits consumers8 1.00 0.75 1.21 0.94 2.12b,d 2.24d,e 4.56b,d 4.71c,e
Number of subjects 96 48 48 48 96 48 48 48
V LV
(verifiability / no liability) (liability / verifiability)
Averages per period B/V R/V C/V CR/V B/LV R/LV C/LV CR/LV
Trade on cons. side1 0.50b,c 0.60d,e 0.88b,d 0.93c,e 0.82b,c 0.76d,e 0.98b,d 0.99c,e
Avg. # of consumers2 1 1 1.63 1.60 1 1 2.27 1.92
Trade on seller side3 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.58 0.82b,c 0.76d,e 0.43b,d 0.52c,e
Efficiency4 0.16b,c 0.30 0.34b 0.46c 0.81 0.71d,e 0.88d 0.93e
Undertreatment5 0.60c 0.38 0.53 0.36c − − − −
Overtreatment6 0.05a,b,c 0.12a 0.13b 0.19c 0.03b,c 0.07 0.12b 0.09c
Overcharging7 − − − − − − − −
pl with trade 5.84b,c 5.74d,e 4.06b,d 3.99c,e 6.88b,c 6.48d,e 4.19b,d 4.20c,e
pl without trade 6.21b 6.31d 4.84b,d 4.84 7.46b,c 6.75d,e 4.59b,d 4.43c,e
ph with trade 7.70b,c 7.69d 6.41b,d 6.97c 7.96b,c 8.04d,e 6.19b,d 6.38c,e
ph without trade 7.82a 8.38a 7.72 7.79 8.83b,c 9.10d,e 7.94b,d 7.65c,e
Actually paid price 6.44b,c 6.60d,e 5.19b,d 5.58c,e 7.46b,c 7.39d,e 5.44b,d 5.49c,e
Profits sellers8 2.58b,c 2.51e 1.96b 1.90c,e 3.10b,c 2.83d,e 1.15b,d 1.31c,e
Profits consumers8 1.06b,c 1.53e 2.18b 2.59c,e 2.37b,c 2.37d,e 4.51b,d 4.49c,e
Number of subjects 88 48 48 48 80 48 48 48
1 relative frequency of consumers trading with a seller
2 average number of consumers treated by a seller who has at least one consumer
3 relative frequency of sellers trading with at least one consumer
4 calculated as (actual average profit − outside option) / (maximum possible average profit − outside option)
5 relative frequency of consumer needs qh, but seller provides ql.
6 relative frequency of consumer needs ql, but seller provides qh.
7 relative frequency of seller provides ql, but charges ph (with ph > pl and consumer needs ql)
8 in experimental currency units
Mann-Whitney U-tests for pairwise differences between treatments (with matching groups of eight subjects as one 
independent observation)
a B versus R (p < 0.05)
b B versus C (p < 0.05)
c B versus CR (p < 0.05)
d R versus C (p < 0.05)
e R versus CR (p < 0.05)
f C versus CR (p < 0.05)
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L). The different effects of reputation in sets N and L show that liability as 
an institutional safeguard for consumers dominates the effects of reputation 
as another means to cope with the informational asymmetries prevalent in 
credence goods markets.
  (v)  pricing. The most prominent price vectors are {6, 8} in set R with 18.4 per-
cent, and {3, 7} both in set C (10.9 percent) and set CR (9.4 percent). While 
vector {6, 8} does not match prediction R in set R, the prominence of vector 
{3, 7} is consistent with predictions C and CR (though this price vector is 
chosen less often than theoretically predicted). Also in line with predictions 
C and CR we find that prices pl and ph are significantly lower with competi-
tion than without. On average, seller competition drives down prices by about 
two units. This can be clearly observed in Table 4 (and in panels E and F of 
Figure S1 in the online Supplement S2). Table 5 takes a closer look at the 
determinants of consumers’ choice of a seller when competition holds by 
looking at the properties of accepted price vectors. Theory predicts that con-
sumers visit the seller with the lowest ph if verifiability is violated, but that 
consumers’ choice of a seller depends on both prices if V holds. From Table 
5 it becomes clear that with verifiability the share of accepted price vectors 
that include the lowest price ph goes down, whereas price vectors with the 
minimum price pl (that do not also have the minimum price ph) become more 
often accepted.18 Thus, consumers’ choice of a seller is largely in line with 
predictions C and CR.
  (vi)  profits. With reputation, the profits of sellers and consumers are basically 
the same as in set B without reputation. This implies that consumers earn 
less than their outside option when liability does not hold in R/N and R/V. 
Introducing competition shifts the gains from trade (almost completely) from 
sellers to consumers, as expected from predictions C and CR. However, 
competition actually drives down sellers’ profits below their outside option 
whenever liability applies.19 Although from the theoretical prediction sellers 
should sell their credence goods also when competition plus liability apply, 
the competitive pressure on prices (to attract consumers) is so strong that 
staying out of the market would have been better for sellers on average.
C. Estimating the Effects of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
In Table 6 we report the coefficients from random effects probit regressions where 
we examine the impact of liability, verifiability, reputation building and competition 
on the relative frequency of trade, undertreatment, overtreatment, and overcharging.20
18 Applying a χ²-test, we find that the distribution of accepted price vectors between rows a) and b) in Table 5 
(both for C and for CR) is significantly different between N and V, and between L and LV (p < 0.05 in both cases). 
Another way of stating this result is that the share of accepted price vectors that include the minimum price ph is 
significantly higher in N than in V, and also higher in L than in LV (p < 0.05 in both cases).
19 For calculating sellers’ average profits in sets C and CR we subtract excessive outside options (that exceed 
the difference between 4 and the number of actual trades in a matching group) in order to make sellers’ profits 
comparable to the sets without competition (i.e., sets B and R).
20 With respect to model selection in Table 6 note that none of the third-order or fourth-order interaction effects 
of the main treatment variables, liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition (as well as the interaction of 
these higher-order effects with period and prices), had been found significant when including them as independent 
variables. The model fit was also improved by dropping any interaction terms where either the period or any of 
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Column 1 of Table 6 considers the likelihood of trade for a seller.21 Looking at 
the main treatment effects one can see that liability and competition have a signifi-
cant effect, whereas verifiability and reputation per se are insignificant. All other 
things being equal, liability has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of trade, 
because consumers can be sure to receive a sufficient quality. Competition has a 
significant negative main effect on the probability of a particular seller attracting a 
consumer for trade, since it leads to a concentration of several consumers interacting 
with the same seller, leaving other sellers without any consumer. The row “average 
# of consumers” in Table 4 shows that sellers that attract at least one customer 
serve, on average, between 1.54 and 2.29 consumers in treatments with seller com-
petition. This concentration leaves other sellers without any consumers, hence the 
negative coefficient for competition in column 1 of Table 6. Contrary to the theoreti-
cal prediction, verifiability has no significant main effect. Reputation also lacks a 
significant main effect, consistent with prediction R. Both prices, pl and ph, have a 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of trade. Recall that predictions B and 
R had implied for sets N and L that the low price pl has no impact on a consumer’s 
decision to enter the market. This is obviously not what we observe. Rather, the low 
price lures consumers into the market. Another noteworthy effect is the interaction 
of the high price with verifiability. If verifiability holds, the negative main effect 
of the high price ph on the likelihood of trade is reduced because an increase in the 
high price renders undertreatment less attractive for sellers. Similarly, reputation has 
a positive interaction effect with the high price ph, indicating that reputation allows 
for a (modest) increase in the high price without endangering the consumer’s will-
ingness to trade with the seller in set N. Finally, note that the likelihood of trade is 
significantly declining across periods—which is an indication of learning—and that 
this downward trend is only partially offset when liability or verifiability applies.
the two prices (pl or ph) had been interacted with a second-order interaction of the main treatment variables (for 
example, “Period × liability × verifiability”).
21 We use the frequency of trade on the seller (and not on the consumer) side as the dependent variable here 
because among the independent variables there are the prices ph and pl and because in the competition treatments 
(where consumers can choose from four price vectors) it would not be clear on which prices the frequency of trade 
on the consumer side should be conditioned upon.
Table 5—Consumers’ Choice of Seller when Competition Applies (sets C and CR)
C (competition / no reputation)
C/N C/L C/V C/LV
Relative frequency with which a consumer chooses a seller with
 a) the minimum price ph (irrespective of order of pl) 0.68 0.90 0.52 0.77
 b) the minimum price pl (but not the minimum price ph) 0.13 0.02 0.23 0.15
 c) neither of the above 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.08
Number of observations 281 381 337 377
CR (competition / reputation)
CR/N CR/L CR/V CR/LV
Relative frequency with which a consumer chooses a seller with
 a) the minimum price ph (irrespective of order of pl) 0.64 0.87 0.44 0.76
 b) the minimum price pl (but not the minimum price ph) 0.17 0.08 0.33 0.13
 c) neither of the above 0.19 0.05 0.23 0.11
Number of observations 326 378 359 382
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Column 2 of Table 6 reports an estimation of the likelihood of undertreatment. 
The most interesting finding from the viewpoint of our predictions is the significant 
negative effect of the high price ph, while the low price pl is not significant per se. 
Note, however, that the interaction terms between both prices and verifiability show 
the predicted sign, although only the term price “pl × verifiability” is significant. 
Undertreatment also becomes more likely with more experience across periods. 
This is an indication that some sellers learn how to exploit the opportunities arising 
in credence goods markets. Column 3 of Table 6 reveals that the likelihood of over-
treatment depends on the low and the high price (as such and in the interaction with 
verifiability) in the predicted direction. The negative effect of price pl and the posi-
tive effect of price ph indicate that overtreatment increases on average in the price 
difference ph − pl. overcharging (see column 4 of Table 6) increases significantly 
across periods and depends otherwise mainly on a seller’s prices. The likelihood of 
overcharging decreases with the low price pl and increases with the high price ph, 
which is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
V.  Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed in a large-scale experiment with 936 participants 
the behavior of experts and consumers on credence goods markets. These markets 
are prone—both in reality and in our experiment—to problems of undertreatment, 
Table 6—Panel Probit Regressions Using Data from All Conditions
Independent variables 
Trade on seller side 
[1]
Undertreatment 
[2]
Overtreatment 
[3]
Overcharging 
[4]
Liability (L = 1) 5.45** NA 0.30 −0.64
Verifiability (V = 1) −0.55 0.19 0.70 NA
Reputation (R = 1) 0.02 −1.69* −0.08 −0.71
Competition (C = 1) −0.85* −0.13 0.22 −1.25**
Liability × Verifiability −0.00 NA 0.04 NA
Liability × Reputation −0.41** NA 0.28 0.60*
Liability × Competition −2.16** NA −0.07 0.34
Verifiability × Reputation −0.11 −0.63* −0.53 NA
Verifiability × Competition 0.26* −0.12 −0.66* NA
Reputation × Competition −0.04 1.84* 0.84 1.25
Price pl −0.13** 0.03 −0.38** −0.61**
Price ph −0.46** −0.56** 0.27** 0.39**
Price pl × Liability 0.03 NA −0.11 0.21*
Price ph × Liability −0.56** NA −0.09 −0.10
Price pl × Verifiability −0.05 0.23** −0.60** NA
Price ph × Verifiability 0.11** −0.11 0.35** NA
Price pl × Reputation −0.06* −0.11 0.04 −0.18
Price ph × Reputation 0.08* 0.31** 0.02 0.13
Price pl × Competition 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.01
Price ph × Competition 0.04 −0.30** −0.18 −0.19
Period −0.08** 0.05** −0.08** 0.06**
Period × Liability 0.04** NA −0.03 −0.02
Period × Verifiability 0.03** −0.05** 0.06** NA
Period × Reputation 0.02 0.00 0.02 −0.03
Period × Competition −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.03
Intercept 4.75** 3.75** −1.61** 0.96
Number of Observations 7,488 1,225 2,902 1,205
notes: NA not applicable, i.e., a given action (dependent variable) is not possible in a particular condition (inde-
pendent variable).
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
548 thE AmERiCAn EConomiC REViEW ApRiL 2011
overtreatment, and overcharging. We start the conclusion by noting that even under 
the most disadvantageous market conditions for consumers, the experimental sellers 
of credence goods have provided an appropriate quality in about half of the cases. 
Furthermore, some sellers have done so very consistently. For instance, in treatment 
B/N we have observed that 27 percent of the sellers have provided the appropri-
ate quality throughout the whole 16 periods of the experiment. Hence, even in the 
absence of liability laws, a substantial fraction of sellers is honest. This finding 
might be explained by social or moral norms (like not to exploit or cheat on others; 
see Uri Gneezy 2005), by guilt aversion (Gary Charness and Dufwenberg 2006), or 
by experts having nontrivial distributional preferences in the sense that they con-
sider not only their own but also their customers’ material payoffs when making 
their provision decisions (see also our discussion below).
The main purpose of this paper has been to study which other means—besides an 
intrinsic motivation, a moral commitment, or a concern for the (material) well-being 
of others—may yield efficient interaction in credence goods markets. More pre-
cisely, we have examined in a 2×2×2×2 experimental design the role of liability, 
verifiability, reputation, and competition. Contrary to standard theory’s prediction, 
verifiability has been found to have almost no effect (compared to a situation with-
out institutional safeguards against fraud). It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that 
forcing sellers of credence goods to charge only for the product quality they have 
actually provided does not approach the roots of the problems.22 At first glimpse 
the main reason for why verifiability does a poor job in enhancing efficiency seems 
to be the very rare use of equal markup vectors. This interpretation does not really 
explain the data, however, for two (related) reasons. First, it only defers the question 
mark to the next level, as it leaves unanswered the question why sellers choose most 
often undertreatment vectors in the first place. Secondly, as we have seen in Section 
IVA, experts’ provision behavior under equal markup prices in condition B/V is far 
from the predicted one, with overtreatment (instead of providing appropriate qual-
ity) being observed in up to 40 percent of cases. Below we argue that experts having 
(heterogeneous) distributional preferences can explain both, why (certain) equal 
markup price vectors work particularly poorly and why equal markup vectors are 
not chosen in the first place.
Liability to provide a sufficient quality has been found to have a very strong effect 
not only on the likelihood of trade on our experimental credence goods markets, but 
also on its efficiency. It seems straightforward that liability makes it very attractive 
for consumers to trade with sellers, as undertreatment is precluded by definition. 
However, overtreatment (which may also create inefficiencies) and overcharging 
(which leads to inefficiencies if the fear of getting overcharged deters consumers 
from interacting with expert sellers) are still possible in B/L, and they might—at 
least in theory—also impose substantial costs on consumers. As we have seen, in the 
experiment they do not: Overtreatment is not a very important phenomenon in any 
of the experimental conditions and overcharging is not very costly for consumers 
22 Hence, it cannot be an effective remedy of the problems on credence goods markets to ask a car mechanic, for 
example, to put the replaced parts in the boot of the car in order to verify the presumed action. Somewhat  ironically, 
this was one of the conclusions offered by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) in their theoretical treatment of cre-
dence goods markets. Our experimental study clearly shows the need to test the behavioral relevance of theories, as 
in our experiment we have found that verifiability is practically of no help.
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since experimentally observed price differences between different qualities are typi-
cally small. However, as we have seen, an institutional safeguard against undertreat-
ment has another important cost for consumers as they pay, on average, far higher 
prices with than without liability. This connection between liability and high costs 
might also be one of the factors that increase the costs of providing health care when 
doctors are required to provide a sufficient quality.23
Reputation as implemented in the experiment has been found to be effective in 
increasing trade in credence goods markets, but only when none of the other effec-
tive means (liability and competition, as it turns out) is present. In this case (R/N), 
reputation building benefits only the sellers, though, as they attract more trade for 
each price level (since consumers are more likely to trust them), but do not change 
their behavior; i.e., the undertreatment rate is not decreasing in the aggregate when 
reputation building is possible. This may be interpreted as evidence that an opportu-
nity to build up reputation can even deteriorate, rather than improve, the situation for 
customers as they might become too credulous. The absence of a reputation effect in 
the other conditions may—at least in part—be driven by the fact that the possibility 
for reputation formation is rather limited in our design since buyers could only recall 
their own experience, but not how other buyers fared with a particular seller. It is an 
open question for future research whether considering a public information condi-
tion—where the consumers in the market get to know the experiences of all other 
consumers with a particular seller—might yield stronger reputation effects. It is not 
clear, however, which of the two informational conditions is empirically the more rel-
evant one. In reality, consumers can always be sure about their own experience with a 
particular expert. Of course, they might get some fuzzy information from neighbors 
and friends, but only rarely they observe the whole history of a particular seller.
Competition among sellers has been found to be very influential, first of all, in 
bringing down the prices for credence goods (compared to a situation of a bilateral 
matching of sellers and consumers), and, second, in increasing the trade volume on 
the market. This is not to say that competition solves all of the problems on credence 
goods markets, because we have also found that the likelihood of undertreatment, 
overtreatment, or overcharging, is not reduced in the aggregate (but interestingly not 
increased either!) through seller competition. This means that the effects of compe-
tition on trade are first and foremost driven by price cuts through competition, while 
the overall level of efficiency is not increased through competition (except when 
verifiability applies).
As noted in the introduction, our paper is most closely related to two experimental 
papers by Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2007, 2008) where they study how reputation 
and competition affect the efficiency on markets for experience goods. Our model of 
a credence goods market can be seen as a generalization of their  experience goods 
market model. In particular, if we set the probability of needing the high quality in our 
23 It has to be noted, though, that strict liability is difficult to impose in real world markets. On the one hand, it 
requires a form of verifiability of the outcome. Especially in the medical realm, treatment success is often impos-
sible or very costly to measure for a court, while still being observed by the consumer (how can one prove the 
presence/absence of pain, for instance?). On the other hand, even in cases where the outcome is verifiable it often 
not only depends on the quality provided by the seller but also on consumer behavior. In both cases issues of moral 
hazard on the consumer side may rule out strict liability. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) discuss these and other 
issues in a section on the theory of credence goods and real world examples.
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credence goods market equal to one (h = 1 in our notation), then our N-treatments 
(B/N, R/N, and C/N) corresponded exactly to their design of a market for experi-
ence goods. Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2008) compare the equivalents of our B/N- 
and R/N-treatments, and Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2007) relate analogously B/N 
to C/N. Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2007, 2008) report pretty large effects of repu-
tation and competition. Whereas competition has also very strong effects in our 
design, we find much weaker effects of reputation. One possible explanation is that 
cheating is always detected in the set up of Huck, Lünser, and Tyran (2008)—which 
makes a good reputation all the more valuable—whereas in our design cheating may 
remain undetected. The latter possibility weakens the importance, and ultimately the 
effects, of reputation.
Regarding the issue of parallelism of our experimental results and real-world cre-
dence goods markets, we note that we have identified in our experiment undertreatment 
(and to a lesser extent overcharging) as the main source of inefficiencies. In markets 
for medical treatments—a prime example of a credence goods market—overtreatment 
seems to be a key problem, however. Our experiment differs from real-world medi-
cal markets in some important dimensions which might explain this difference. First, 
prices in the health care sector are typically exogenous to the sellers of health care 
services. If those exogenously given price vectors are of the overtreatment type (which 
is very rarely the case in our experiment with endogenous prices), then overtreatment 
may become more likely due to financial incentives. For example, in some countries 
the markups for Cesarean deliveries seem to be higher than those for normal child 
births, increasing the likelihood of Cesarean deliveries (Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 
1999). Second, diagnosis is assumed to be perfect (in the sense of revealing the appro-
priate quality for sure) in our experiment while it is almost always imperfect in real-
ity. If providers of credence goods can be sued for insufficient quality (meaning that 
some form of liability applies), imperfect diagnosis creates incentives for overtreat-
ment. Third, in the realm of medical services patients typically do not pay the fees for 
health care provision themselves, but insurance companies do. This fact reduces the 
incentives for patients to take care of themselves, and it makes patients less worried 
about overtreatment as they do not carry the full social costs. These differences may 
explain why in the market for health care services overtreatment seems to be a big-
ger problem than undertreatment and overcharging. However, many other markets for 
credence goods do suffer from problems created by undertreatment and overcharging 
which have been identified as main problems in our experiment. For instance, Henry 
Schneider (2006) finds in his field study on fraudulent behavior in the auto repair busi-
ness substantial evidence of all three kinds of fraud: (i) completely unnecessary repairs 
or repairs that use more labor or parts than necessary (i.e., overtreatment); (ii) neglect 
of defects that require urgent attention (undertreatment); and (iii) billing for parts and 
labor not provided (overcharging). Also, taxi rides in an unknown city may not only 
be prone to attempts of overtreatment (by taking a circuitous route) but also result in 
overcharging (by manipulating the taximeter and therewith the distance traveled, for 
example) and even undertreatment (failure to reach the desired destination).24
24 See a recent test of the ADAC (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil Club, Germany’s largest automo-
bile club) on http://www1.adac.de/Tests/Mobilitaet_und_Reise/taxitest/ergebnisse/default.asp?ComponentID 
= 234050&SourcePageID = 235884.
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We conclude by noting that our experimental results might be an important 
stimulus for the further development of the theory of credence goods markets. 
Our theoretical analysis of the experimental behavior has been guided by a model 
that assumes standard economic preferences (along the lines developed in Dulleck 
and Kerschbamer 2006). It is noteworthy that despite its simplicity the model has 
been able to predict several of our key findings at least in a qualitative way (for 
example, the importance of liability for efficiency and trade, the impact of markup 
differences on provision behavior under verifiability, the lack of an influence of 
reputation, and the tremendous effect of competition on prices and volume of 
trade, as well as consumers’ reaction to different price vectors). Our simple model 
has failed, however, in predicting the null effect of verifiability on trade volume 
and efficiency on credence goods markets. More specifically, we have found that 
market performance in conditions with verifiability (but without liability) is sub-
stantially worse than standard theory’s prediction, while market performance in 
conditions without verifiability (and without liability) is much better than pre-
dicted, leading to both conditions performing equally (well or poor) in the aggre-
gate. What causes those results? In a companion paper (Kerschbamer, Sutter, and 
Dulleck 2009) we argue that experimental experts’ heterogeneous distributional 
preferences are the key to understanding the failure of verifiability to induce trade 
and increase efficiency in experimental credence goods markets. There we also 
argue that experts’ heterogeneous distributional preferences can not only explain 
the failure of verifiability but also the fact that market performance under N is 
better than predicted and the fact that the performance under L is almost exactly 
as predicted. Before presenting the arguments, it is important to recall from the 
results section that distributional concerns seem to play an important role in our 
experiment. The price vector {6, 8}—which has no special appeal from standard 
theory’s perspective—is by far the most prominent price vector at the price post-
ing stage of the game in all four basic treatments of set B (accounting for 38 per-
cent of observations in B/V, for instance). As mentioned earlier, this price vector 
would split the gains from trade equally between sellers and consumers—if sellers 
always provided the appropriate quality and always charged for the delivered qual-
ity—and its prevalence is therefore an indication that relative payoffs matter for 
experts’ behavior. Also, as discussed earlier, the most often chosen equal markup 
vector in B/V (i.e., {4, 8}) induces a considerable amount of overtreatment which 
contradicts the standard theory’s prediction, but which is exactly what theories 
of inequality aversion (e.g., Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt 1999, Gary E. Bolton 
and Axel Ockenfels 2000) would predict.25 Finally, as we have seen earlier, there 
is a considerable amount of appropriate treatment even in the condition without 
institutional safeguards against fraud (i.e., even in set N), which is an indication 
that a taste for efficiency (Charness and Matthew Rabin 2002) might play a role 
for experts’ behavior.
25 Kerschbamer, Sutter, and Dulleck (2009) show that the overtreatment prediction under the equal markup vec-
tor {4, 8} does not depend on the functional form in which inequality-averse preferences are modelled (let alone on 
specific parameterizations of a specific functional form), but is a consequence of inequality aversion per se. That 
is, any model of inequality aversion that has the equal split as the reference point must predict overtreatment under 
this vector.
552 thE AmERiCAn EConomiC REViEW ApRiL 2011
In Kerschbamer, Sutter, and Dulleck (2009) we provide a thorough theoretical 
analysis of the impact of different types of distributional preferences for experts’ 
provision behavior under verifiability. Based on the theoretical analysis we then 
develop a theoretical test that allows classifying experimental experts in different 
distributional types according to their provision behavior in a market with exog-
enously given prices (in contrast to the endogenous determination of prices in the 
present paper). In the implementation of the test we find that only a minority of 
experts behave according to standard theory’s prediction while a clear majority of 
the subject population exhibits nontrivial distributional preferences.
How do these findings relate to the main results in the present study? The crucial 
insight is that one and the same heterogeneity in distributional preferences can lead 
to a positive or a negative deviation from standard theory’s prediction, depending 
on subtle features of institutional design. The positive deviation potentially comes 
either from efficiency-loving experts who are willing to help their customers if 
the “price for helping” is not too high or from inequality-averse experts who care 
for customers in the domain of advantageous inequality. The negative deviation is 
caused by inequality-averse experts who have a propensity to harm their customers 
in the domain of disadvantageous inequality or by competitive experts willing to 
hurt customers if the “price for hurting” is not too high.
Consider set N first. Under this condition the downside of distributional preferences 
cannot manifest itself in the market outcome since the standard prediction (undertreat-
ment and overcharging under each price vector) is already a worst case scenario. By 
contrast, the positive side of distributional preferences immediately manifests itself in 
a better market outcome than predicted under standard preferences. Under set V, by 
contrast, we get almost the opposite result (where the “almost” disappears in the case 
of equal markup price vectors, where experts can change their customer’s material 
payoff at no personal cost): Under equal markup price vectors the standard prediction 
(appropriate treatment independent of the level of markups) is already a best case 
scenario, so the positive side of distributional preferences cannot improve it. By con-
trast, the downside of distributional preferences easily manifests itself in the market 
outcome because hurting the customer involves no cost under equal markup vectors 
(and little cost under vectors that do not deviate too far from the equal markup rule). 
Taking the evidence from the N-condition and the V-condition together, it follows 
that none of these market institutions is robust against the coexistence of experts with 
heterogeneous distributional preferences. But this is not the case for liability.
In set L the downside of distributional preferences cannot lead to deviations from 
the standard prediction since undertreatment is ruled out by design and since over-
charging is already the standard prediction. Hence, only overtreatment remains as a 
possible harm to efficiency, but overtreatment (in comparison to overcharging) only 
reduces the expert’s material payoff without affecting that of the customer and is there-
fore unattractive for experts independent of their distributional type. The positive side 
of distributional preferences cannot have a deep impact either, since the benchmark 
prediction is already full efficiency—so the only positive impact can be a distribu-
tional one, and indeed we observe overcharging rates that are high, but far below the 
predicted 100 percent.
Hence, we can explain the (unexpected) differences in the effects of liability 
and verifiability by an asymmetry in the robustness of the two institutions to the 
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 coexistence of experts with heterogeneous distributional preferences.26 There are 
other asymmetries which might contribute to the difference. First, there is an asym-
metry in worst-case payoffs: while in the case of undertreatment (which is only 
possible in the treatments without liability, i.e., in N and V) consumers necessarily 
experience actual losses, overtreatment (possible in all treatments but dominated 
by overcharging in the treatments without verifiability) and overcharging (possible 
only in the treatments without verifiability, i.e., in N and L) do not imply real losses 
in practice, but rather “only” lower profits (which may be perceived as less severe 
by consumers). If consumers care predominantly about losses, then they are more 
likely to abstain from the market when losses are possible than when they are not. 
Note, however, that this asymmetry (in worst-case payoffs) is only a practical, but 
not a theoretical one, since theoretically losses are also possible in treatments with 
liability when sellers post and charge prices that exceed consumers’ valuation for 
a successful intervention. However, in the experiment price vectors with ph > v are 
very rarely posted by sellers and almost never (i.e., only in 0.3 percent of cases) 
accepted by customers. Also note that the asymmetry in worst-case payoffs is less 
a peculiarity of our experimental design and more an immanent characteristic of 
the good under consideration.27 Verifiability and liability may also have had dif-
ferent effects because of an asymmetry in the precision of feedback given after an 
interaction. Undertreatment can be identified by consumers in our experiment, while 
overtreatment and overcharging can not. If consumers care predominantly about 
(not) being defrauded by experts, then they are more likely to abstain from the 
market when fraud is visible (as it is in the case of undertreatment in sets N and V) 
than when it is not (as it is in the case of overcharging in set L). Again, we do not 
consider this asymmetry (in the precision of feedback) as a peculiarity of our experi-
mental design but rather as an idiosyncratic feature of the good under consideration. 
In sum, we regard the different explanations for the different effects of liability and 
verifiability as complementary to each other. While the asymmetry in robustness of 
institutions story gives a (market supply side) explanation for why we observe more 
fraud than predicted under standard assumptions in sets N and V and less fraud than 
predicted in set L, the other two asymmetries focus on the demand side of the mar-
ket, i.e., on consumers’ reactions to fraud.
Our overall conclusion is twofold: First, the results of our experimental investiga-
tion clearly indicate the need to test the behavioral relevance of theoretical results, 
especially if they are used to derive policy conclusions. Secondly, more theoreti-
cal research is needed on the impact of experts with heterogeneous other-regarding 
preferences on the performance of markets for credence goods.
26 It is important to note that our arguments do not depend on any assumptions on the distribution of different 
social-preference types in the population (i.e., on which fraction of the subjects exhibit inequality aversion, which 
fraction a taste for efficiency, etc.) and on how specific social preferences are modelled. What is important, though, 
is that there is some heterogeneity in preference types.
27 Undertreatment refers to a situation where a consumer pays a price for a good that does not work properly—a 
situation which has great potential to be a loss situation also in reality. By contrast, overtreatment and overcharging 
can also in real markets only lead to losses if the consumer accepts prices that exceed his valuation for a successful 
intervention.
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